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Abstract
For the past year we have applied a variety of risk assessment technologies to evaluate the risk to
critical infrastructure from cyber attacks on control systems. More recently, we identified the
need for a stand alone control system risk reduction estimation tool to provide owners and
operators of control systems with a more useable, reliable, and credible method for managing the
risks from cyber attack. Risk is defined as the probability of a successful attack times the value of
the resulting loss, typically measured in lives and dollars. Qualitative and ad hoc techniques for
measuring risk do not provide sufficient support for cost benefit analyses associated with cyber
security mitigation actions. To address the need for better quantitative risk reduction models we
surveyed previous quantitative risk assessment research; evaluated currently available tools;
developed new quantitative techniques [17] [18]; implemented a prototype analysis tool to
demonstrate how such a tool might be used; used the prototype to test a variety of underlying risk
calculational engines (e.g. attack tree, attack graph); and identified technical and research needs.
We concluded that significant gaps still exist and difficult research problems remain for
quantitatively assessing the risk to control system components and networks, but that a useable
quantitative risk reduction estimation tool is not beyond reach.
1.0 Background
The U.S. infrastructures that provide electricity, transportation, chemicals, foods, etc., are
increasingly being networked to increase production and services, and simplify management. A
control system usually serves as a key subsystem within these networks. Control systems are
generally composed of sensors, controllers, computer systems, multiple communications
channels, and human operators (see Figure 1).
1.1 Control System Connectivity and Standardization
For efficiency, control systems are increasingly being connected to the Internet and corporate
business networks. In addition, control system sensors, controllers, operating systems, and
console software are becoming more standardized and commercially available. These actions,
although positive and generally efficient, open control systems to similar vulnerabilities and
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potentials for cyber attack that plague Internet-connected computers today. On average, it is
estimated that seven new vulnerabilities in commercial software systems are identified every day
[31]. Exposing the control systems used to manage our critical infrastructures to these
vulnerabilities and threats are of great concern because once they are compromised an attacker
can potentially assume control of the system, and drive it to a failed state causing damage and
even loss of life [9].
To get some idea of the complexity level emerging from this increased connectivity and
movement to standardized protocols and commercial-off-the shelf software, consider a typical set
of software installed on three different computers. One high-level analysis model for the three
hosts, one firewall, and one router contain on the order of 290 potential system states, each of
which might constitute vulnerabilities that allow attackers to control the critical assets of the
system [28]. If the size of the system is increased to five hosts, the number of estimated states
increases to 2229 states. Control systems in critical infrastructure (e.g. electrical grids) contain
many more hosts and intelligent devices with potential vulnerabilities that increase the
complexity to a point where a statement about the Internet made by a Notre Dame physicist, Dr.
Barabási, rings true: “Increasingly, we are realizing that our lack of understanding of the Internet
and the Web…is rooted in the absence of a scientific framework to characterize the topology of
the network behind it.” [1].
Therefore, attempts to increase the security of control systems must deal with this extreme
complexity. The difficulty in analyzing and managing the associated risk is amplified by each
Figure 1 Simplified example of a control system applied to mixing two fluids remotely.
control system vendor offering unique system configurations that include different types of
computer hardware and software operating system platforms. Some of these are legacy systems
that date back 20-plus years. Users also have unique collections of sensors, communications
media and equipment, and various generations of system components within their facilities. The
movement is toward ever greater connectivity.
2.0 Risk Estimation
Problems, associated analyses, and, in particular, the risk model described in this paper may be
dependent on the particular context being addressed. The context in which particular problems are
found can vary by purpose (e.g., prevention, detection, ranking, etc.), scale (e.g., national,
regional, sector, site, control system, component), audience (e.g., DHS, industry, academia), and
kind (e.g., random process, intelligent game, etc.). Simply stated, a change of context demands a
different abstraction of the problem. A problem, for instance, identified and applicable on a
national level will require different thinking and solutions than those dealing with a local site
issue. The rest of this paper focuses on the issue of evaluating the risk reduction to an individual
site without consideration of the influence of other perhaps more easily attacked facilities.
2.1 Definition of Risk
One formal definition of risk is the probability of a negative event multiplied by the impact. Risk
can thus be defined in this formal quantitative sense, as the probability of an unwanted
consequence (j) occurring from an event (i) multiplied by the value of that consequence, or:
Rij = Pi*Cj (1)
In addition, the overall risk to the system being characterized, assuming independence of events
and consequences, is defined as the sum of overall consequences and events, or:
=
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2.2 Proposed Probability Decomposition
The first term in the risk model (Equation 1) represents the probability of some event (Pi)
occurring. This event, for the control system cyber security problem, is a successful attack that
results in the consequence (C) being realized. Though simple to write down, this event probability
can be difficult, and at times impossible, to estimate with any confidence.
A successful terrorist launched cyber attack (Pi) should be decomposed into multiple factors that
correspond to the thoughts and actions of both attackers and defenders of a facility. The
decomposition must match the problem space and should be reasonably intuitive to understand
for both the risk model builder and the user. A proper decomposition allows model builders and
users to clarify mental models, which enhances communication and supports proper interpretation
of the model outputs.
A variety of decompositions of Pi have been suggested in the literature [2] [15] [22]. The
decomposition we have chosen, which we will use as the general foundation of any risk model
built for specific decisions, is specifically tailored for control systems, retains a focus on the
intelligent adversary, and has intuitive meaning for the user. The equation for this decomposition
is:
pi = F(t, a, b, s, c) (3)
where the terms on the right side are defined as “events” for facility i:
t = the facility is on the target list of terrorist groups
a = the terrorist group launches an attack against facility i
b = facility control system perimeter is breached
s = the internal system components necessary for a successful attack are compromised
c = a system event occurs that generates the consequence(s).
Equation 3 defines the occurrence probability of a control system mediated consequence as a
function of variables related to circumventing system defense. The variables (Equation 3) are
event related, but can be modeled and functionally related to final event probability in a number
of different ways. For example, the variable t, could be modeled as the probability that a facility
is on the target list or alternatively assumed to be 1.0 for a specific facility.
The general functional form of Equation 3 allows for various approaches to be used in estimating
the probability of consequence. A variety of models can be constructed from the general form by
making different assumptions about the terms. For example, if the terms are defined as predictor
variables in, say, a general linear statistical model, estimates of coefficients are determined using
information and data; hence, the estimate of probability of consequence. However, in this paper
we will decompose the probability into a multiple of the conditional probabilities associated with
an attacker achieving the “events” specified above. This decomposition is given as
csbati PPPPPP = (4)
3.0 Risk Reduction Estimation Tool
Our control systems risk reduction estimation tool prototype was constructed to demonstrate the
overall concept to customers, obtain additional requirements, study the feasibility of quantitative
risk reduction estimation, and more firmly define research and development needs. The prototype
integrates security requirements—both technical and administrative controls, a network
description with known vulnerabilities, and a variety of underlying risk reduction estimation
models. Other products, tools, and functions were discussed but are not currently part of the
prototype2. Overall, the prototype presents the user with an interface that shows risk reduction as
various security measures are added or removed from the network, see Figure 2.
The primary elements of the interface are the threat level, possible defensive mitigation measures,
complete control system network specification, a time to compromise metric to assist in risk
reduction estimation, an estimate of the potential consequences to the system owner, and percent
risk reduction estimation as defensive measures are added or removed. Each of these is briefly
described and discussed in the rest of this paper.
3.1 Threat Level
By threat we mean an intelligent adversary who may choose to attack the infrastructure through
its control system. A threat must have intent, capability, and opportunity. Intent implies that the
adversary values the damage that might be caused if they are able to successfully attack the
infrastructure more than the cost they might have to bear. Intent affects the probability that the
2 Examples of other tools that could be integrated include, user requirements traceability, alternate network views
including hierarchical, geospatial, time to compromise, etc. and integration with CERT incident management systems.
infrastructure will be targeted and attacked. Capability relates to the conditional probability that
the adversary will actually attack and be successful in causing damage to the system. And
opportunity means that the adversary must have access to the vulnerabilities in the system so that
his capabilities may be used to cause the desired damage.
A variety of taxonomies have been used to partition threats into sets that are useful for analysis.
Unfortunately, each of the taxonomies that we found mixed the concepts of intent, capability, and
opportunity in such a way as to make a categorization of a specific group problematic. For
example, using the Blackhat taxonomy as shown in Table 1 how would one categorize an insider
with limited hacking skills who is a member of an Islamic terrorist cell? That insider belongs to at
least three of the categories in the taxonomy. Each of the taxonomies in Table 1 have a similar
weakness in their lack of clarity.
We propose that threat taxonomies for risk estimation be thought of as three dimensional objects
with dimensions consisting of intent, capability, and opportunity:
Threati = (Intenti , Capabilityi , Opportunityi ).
Further, each of these dimensions should be explicitly discussed and preferably defined before a
risk assessment is performed. An initial taxonomy that we propose consists of two types of
opportunity; four types of capability; and six categories of intent.
3.1.1 Threat Intent
Intent is probably the most difficult threat dimension to firmly establish. The initial
categorization that we used partitioned intent into the categories of rock star, vandal, criminal
Figure 2. Risk reduction estimation prototype interface.
enterprise, foreign intelligence, terrorists, and nation states. A rock star is an individual or group
whose sole intent is to gain notoriety by attacking infrastructure. For a rock star, damage is not a
particularly desired outcome unless it enhances their renown as skilled hackers. A vandal
represents a threat intent on doing damage for damage sake by cyber attack. A criminal enterprise
includes attacks by organized crime pursuing monetary profit, and corporate spying in pursuit of
information that would provide competitive advantage. Foreign intelligence includes all
government sponsored entities whose mission is to acquire information that can be used to
advance their countries interests. Terrorist intent is to generate infrastructure events to instill fear
in a civilian population to further their political aims. A terrorist, by our definition, is not
controlled by a nation state. A nation state represents a threat intent on damaging another
countries infrastructure in order to further their nation’s strategic goals. Other categories related
to intent may be needed as the threat landscape continues to evolve.
Table 1 Three threat taxonomies.
Cyber Threats to Critical
Infrastructure (blackhat) [25]
Threats to Critical Infrastructure
[9]
Cyber Attacker Categories
[5]
Hacker/Script Kiddies/Hobbyist Criminal group Terrorist groups
Disgruntled Employee Foreign intelligence services Nation States
Insider aiding others Hackers Anti-Capitalism/Anti-Globalization and
terrorist Sympathizers
Hacktivist Hacktivists Thrill Seekers
Industrial Espionage Information Warfare
Foreign Espionage Insider threat
Terrorist Virus writers
State Sponsored Attack
3.1.2 Threat Capability
Capability as it relates to the estimation of risk to the infrastructure from attacks through the
control system should focus on the adversary’s cyber attack skill. This might involve their
technical skills in finding and exploiting electronic system vulnerabilities or their skills in social
engineering. The initial partitioning we created relates strictly to technical skill and includes the
categories of novice, beginner, intermediate, and advanced hacker.
3.1.3 Threat Opportunity
Because of its ease of use and categorization we partitioned opportunity into the rough
categories of insider and outsider. By definition an insider is defined as someone who has
approved user privileges to one or more network devices that are inside or part of the perimeter of
the control system under evaluation. This definition aids in understanding that the insider my not
only initiate attacks from inside the systems boundary but may also just prepare the system for
external attack (e.g. the insider may install a back door for a remote compatriot).
3.1.4 Percent Risk Reduction Metric
As previously mentioned in Equation 4, we have decomposed the probability of generating a
consequence from an attack on the control system into the probability of being targeted, and the
conditional probabilities of being attacked, of the attack breaching the systems perimeter
defenses, of the necessary internal system components being compromised, and of the desired
consequence being generated. A more complete discussion of each of these probabilities can be
found in [12].
These probabilities may be different for each category of attacker. Since our concerns revolve
around terrorist groups and nation states we had to address the issue of infrastructure owners not
having much if any information relative to those groups’ specific targets or their capabilities for
cyber attacks into the infrastructure control systems. Further, while some control system incident
data has been collected [11], the data is still too sparse to yield any confidence in the underlying
statistics. Consequently, estimating the probability of attack is currently unresolved.
For these reasons we were not confident that an absolute risk metric was currently feasible so we
decided on a different measure than absolute risk. By estimating the percent risk reduction, and
assuming that the individual probabilities are independent, the unknown probabilities can be
ignored since we can assume they stay unchanged as defensive measures are added or removed.
In Equation 5, the probabilities with subscripts labeled (new) are those that have changed due to
changes in system defensive controls or configuration.
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3.1.5 Threat Specification In Risk Reduction Estimation Prototype Tool
In our Risk Reduction Estimation prototype we allow some indirect indication of threat intent by
allowing the user to specify which nodes on the system are targets of the threat.
In our prototype, the user can choose between four threat levels: Novice, Beginner, Intermediate,
and Expert. These threat levels represent the four capability levels we postulated in previous risk
analysis research [17] and chose to use in the prototype tool. These models and their associated
measures of time to compromise, rate of attack, etc… present significant investment opportunities
for research development and validation.
In the Risk Reduction Estimation prototype tool the percent risk reduction values and time to
compromise measures are dependent upon the threat level chosen by the user. A threat level must
be chosen by the user before a defense list is shown and available. The four threat levels chosen
for the prototype have specific definitions that relate to their individual skill levels. The
definitions may be found in [17]
3.2 Defensive Mitigation Measures
A control system usually includes a control room environment which may consist of standard
computers running pervasive operating systems such as Windows or Solaris. The applications on
these computers are usually control system specific unless implementing a standard functional
need such as a data base. Attached to the control room computers is a network of communication
and control devices such as remote terminal units and programmable logic controllers. The
protocols and applications running on these devices are vendor dependent and often installation
selectable. Often the control system specific components are older software and hardware than
typically found on standard enterprise networks or even at home. More and more frequently the
control network is being connected to the enterprise network. Further, this interconnection
between the enterprise network, the control room(s), and one or more control system subnets
using a wide range of technology leads to a puzzling security picture. This creates an even greater
need for a well thought out, specified, and implemented security program whose posture can be
clearly and definitively expressed to a variety of management levels through security and risk
metrics related to system components and defensive mechanisms.
Defensive mitigation measures include both administrative and technical controls. The
administrative controls include items such as a written security policy, adoption of best practices,
specification and collection of security metrics for each level of reporting, security maintenance
programs, regular vulnerability assessment audits, and security education and training for those
responsible for day to day operations. The technical controls include tangible defensive
components such as a firewalls and intrusion prevention systems, adoption of appropriate
cryptographic protocols to prevent replay or man in the middle attacks, network architectures to
optimize security within operational constraints, and technical security metric collection and
evaluation.
3.2.1 Administrative Controls
Administrative controls must include measures that are well accepted within the enterprise
security management community and other mitigation measures tailored for the unique needs of
control systems. An assessment of security for a given facility should be based on codes,
standards, and adopted policy. One example of this approach may be found in [13] where over
1000 security survey questions were culled from ISO 17799 Code of Practice for Information
Security Management, NIST SP 800-26 Security self-Assessment Guide for Information
Technology Systems, and the OCTAVE Catalog of Practices. An example of control system
specific questions is a survey currently under development at INL based on the NIST SPP-ICS
baseline set of security requirements for new control systems.
3.2.2 Technical controls
Technical controls should be based on best practices but also tailored for each individual control
system. The adoption and configuration of security devices and mechanisms would ideally be
based on the cost of installation and up keep of the device as compared to the risk reduction it
provides. Unfortunately, the capability for quantitatively measuring the effectiveness of security
mechanisms is currently beyond the state of the art. However, recent research efforts are
beginning to bear some fruit and technical quantitative security measures appear to be a
promising area for research and development over the next five years. Also, as previously
mentioned, it is an unresolved issue of how to calculate the absolute risk in dollars (or lives) to a
system. This indicates an opportunity for improved attack detection and assessment research, and
nation or world wide attack and event data collection effort.
3.2.3 Security Controls In The Risk Reduction Estimation Prototype Tool
In the Risk Reduction Estimation Prototype tool, the defense list indicates which controls are
available to reduce the risk of a successful attack on the system. The defenses in this list are
related to both administrative and technical system defensive measures as previously discussed.
The defenses chosen by the user and applied to the system are used to calculate percent risk
reduction values. The defensive measure list requires more investigation. At too high a level of
abstraction the value of the control is so generic that meaningful information about the reduction
in risk is difficult to assess. But too low a level of abstraction (e.g. the actual firewall rule set) will
provide too much data and might well be difficult to convert to a common, higher level, security
abstraction for each vendor or component. Research into the appropriate levels of abstraction for
each generic device and into tools that would take specific device data and transform them into
useable standard form and semantics is still needed.
3.3 Control System Network Specification
The control system network specification contains a visual display of the system of interest, its
components, and their connections. Information concerning the software and associated
vulnerabilities related to a specific component should be available by clicking on the component
of interest. Also, as specific hardware related defenses are implemented, such as a firewall
installation, the component must be added to the network specification. One need here is for a
passive discovery tool that may be connected to a control system, perhaps in a variety of
locations, that builds a model of the system through analysis of the network traffic. A useable
discovery tool requires some applied research and a significant amount of developmental effort.
One recent research initiative in this area is [6]. Another need is for a very small and safe host
based software vulnerability scanner that assesses the potential flaws in component configuration,
identifies known vulnerabilities, and estimates the level of unknown risk. Both the network
discovery tool and host based scanner will most likely be independent of the risk reduction
estimation tool but they are necessary to provide critical topological and vulnerability information
about the control system.
3.4 Security Models and Measures
For at least three decades security measures and models have been investigated. The results of
these investigations have been mixed. In the subfield of cryptography there has been significant
success in both designing cryptographic ciphers and protocols, and analyzing them to establish
correct behavior. The analysis has generally been through open expert review [20], formal
methods [7], and mathematical and algorithmic analysis (e.g. the difficulty in factoring) [8].
Making certain assumptions explicit such as the cipher is known but the key is secret has helped
lead to a common framework in which to analyze the security of ciphers and protocols. Generally
the analysis leads to either an estimate of average time to discover the key or to an estimate of the
number of tries that would be needed. Passwords are another area that is both well studied and
well understood.
Passwords may be categorized by their length and by their entropy (roughly speaking entropy is a
measure of the randomness in the characters). Greater length and greater entropy lead to
increasing the average number of tries and time necessary for discovering the password. The
practical weaknesses have also been well studied including the fact that most users still select
passwords that have very low entropy. Administrative controls have been made available to help
force users to make password selections that are more difficult to break.
It is worth noting that due to the solid scientific underpinning of the analysis, the explicit
statement and acceptance of the assumptions (e.g. both plain text and associated cipher text are
available), and the intuitive and meaningful measures used, the security provided by
cryptographic ciphers, protocols, and passwords are well understood. Unfortunately, the success
in developing measures and models in other security subfields have been rather less successful. In
the measures and models we have looked to use for analyzing the risk reduction in a control
system from the adoption of defensive measures there is little consensus on measures or models.
3.4.1 Security Models
Security models have been developed for many scales of analysis. On a national scale, attempts
are being made to model the interdependencies of critical infrastructure through simulations [19].
Other, game theoretic, approaches for estimating the risk to a given facility by including the value
and defense posture of other infrastructure components have been proposed by [15] and [10]. For
a given facility risk assessment techniques have included surveys based on standards and codes
[30], and models that don’t need explicit knowledge of the system connectedness or
vulnerabilities [23]. For the Risk Reduction Estimation tool we were interested in a model that
would make use of all the information that might be available about the control system
components, communication channels, and protective measures.
Many models have been proposed for assessing the security posture of an electronic network
based on detailed data about the system being evaluated. The more recent attempts have included
different types of fault trees, attack trees, attack graphs, and game theoretic models. To date we
have applied the first three types of models to our calculation engine used in our risk reduction
estimation. Each has their strengths and limitations which are discussed below. The fourth set of
models, making use of game theoretic principles, seems quite promising but we have not made
use of them yet.
3.4.1.1 Fault Trees
A good review of fault trees may be found in [24]. Fault trees have been applied successfully too
many reliability problems over the last few decades. They have been useful in a variety of
contexts. The system detail they capture is dependent on the risk associated with failure and the
time available for analysis. In our application of the method to detailed risk assessment in a
control system three significant difficulties arose.
The first difficulty was in assessing the failure rates for the different nodes and communication
channels in a control system. Since the threat is intelligent and adaptive it is not at all obvious
how to estimate the failure rates since their randomness is called into question. We refer to
successful attack of a component as a compromise in order to emphasize the lack of a random
failure process.
The second difficulty lay in the dense interdependencies between component failures. For
example, suppose a control room is made up of seven computers with one of them being an
intermediate target. Then an external attacker may be able to reach the target directly; or the
attacker might have to first compromise one of the other machines before compromising the
intermediate target, or the attacker might prefer to compromise one of the other machines first in
order to compromise a second machine with which there are trust relationships followed by a
compromise of the intermediate target; etc. Without credible component compromise rates and
with the large number of compromise paths just suggested it is not possible to winnow the fault
tree down to just those failure modes that are the most likely.
The last difficulty we incurred in our application of a fault tree was the need to automate the
generation of the underlying fault tree based on the network topology and the technical defensive
measures that are added, removed, or modified.
We brought in INL experts to aid us in applying fault tree technology since the methodology is so
intuitive and well understood. Unfortunately, while initially optimistic, our experts were unable to
overcome the significant obstacles mentioned above. Consequently while we believe that fault
trees may have a role to play at a higher level of abstraction, they do not seem to be a good
solution when faced with detailed control system information and an intelligent adversary.
3.4.1.2 Attack Trees
Attack Trees for security analysis were first proposed in 1999 by Schneier [27]. The purpose in
constructing an attack tree is to aid a security analyst in identifying the most likely attack paths,
and to help guide effective application of limited defensive resources. Since attack trees are not
comprehensive in their identification of all possible attack sequences, they are highly dependent
on the experience of the team of security analysts who build them. Another problem in applying
this technique is that the process of building an attack tree does not appear to be amenable to
automated construction. A final problem is that the weights needed for each leaf node in order to
discover the best application of defensive resources is dependent, once again, on expert
elicitation.
Despite these drawbacks we are pursuing collaborative work in building a generic control system
attack tree, and hope that, in the short term, it will be a useful aid for security analysts in
identifying reasonable applications of defensive resources in control systems. Figure 3 is an
example attack tree that resulted from this effort. We do not believe that attack trees constitute a
long run solution for detailed security and risk assessment.
3.4.1.3 Attack Graphs
In principle attack graphs generate all attack paths available to an attacker [29]. Many different
algorithms have been proposed for automated generation of attack graphs and they all depend on
fairly detailed knowledge about the networks topology and the vulnerabilities on each node and
communication channel. We encountered three issues in the use of attack graphs when we applied
them to our test network. The first is that the runtime of the model checking algorithms suffer
from exponential growth and currently become impractical for use in modeling even very small
networks. The second problem is that since the number of attack paths grows exponentially in the
number of nodes, the graph quickly becomes unwieldy. Consequently, the graph is currently only
suitable for automated analysis. And thirdly, what security and risk analysis conclusions can be
drawn from the graphs are unclear.
When we applied the model checking attack graph generation methods proposed by Sheyner et.
al. [29] to our test network, we were not surprised to find that they suffered from exponential
growth in runtime relative to the number of nodes in the network. What did startle us was that the
exponential growth was so bad that even a small subset of nodes in our test network quickly
overwhelmed the model checker. The poor runtime performance of the attack graph toolkit can be
seen in the data we collected for simulated networks of various sizes and graphically presented in
Figure 4.
With slight modifications to the underlying attack assumptions (e.g. monotonicity) some quite
clever polynomial growth algorithms have been discovered and applied. One of these recently
invented techniques has been instantiated in a tool suite named MulVal whose details may be
found in [21]. We applied this research tool to the same set of simulated networks as before and
Figure 3 Example partial attack tree. Local attack through an HMI terminal.
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Figure 4. Graph generation time of Attack Graph Toolkit and MulVal (plotted on a
log scale) for simulated networks of various sizes and 5 vulnerabilities per host.
the vastly superior runtime performance of MulVal is clearly shown in Figure 4. We are currently
collaborating with the originators of MulVal to further research and development into the entire
tool suite for application to control system risk analysis.
The issue of the number of attack paths growing exponentially in the number of nodes is to be
expected. There are a number of ideas that have been proposed to make the graph more useable
by risk and security analysts. These involve ideas for pruning the graph, only displaying user
designated portions of the graph, providing a query system that determines what portion of the
graph to display based on the question being asked by the analyst, or developing an automated
process to provide a meaningful, higher level abstraction, of the graph. Another technique and
one we are currently investigating, is simply to use the attack graph as input to an underlying
analysis engine and never display the graph to the analyst.
The last issue is a question of what analysis can be done with the graph once it has been
generated. Unfortunately, the current state of the art does not provide any scientifically based
mechanisms for weighting the attack graph edges. Thus we are currently left with little else than
applying basic and essentially unbelievable measures and interpretation of the attack graphs. This
issue is discussed below in section 3.4.2 Security Measures.
3.4.1.4 Game Theoretic Models
Game theoretic models applied to cyber security have recently been investigated [3] [14]. The
strength of these approaches is the rigorous mathematical modeling of intelligent adversarial
relationships. The approaches are not fully developed and it will be interesting to see the results
of future research. A current weakness in each model we have seen is a lack of guidance in how
to generate the parameters necessary to make the models useable. (This is also true for all other
models we investigated).
3.4.2 Security Measures
Similar to security models, security measures have been proposed and evaluated for many scales
of analysis. Few have gained acceptance within the communities they were aimed at. For the level
of analysis we are attempting with the Risk Reduction Estimation tool one can find models that
require many different security measures for individual functional components including
difficulty, effort, time, rate of vulnerability discovery, patch rate, and probability of component
compromise. Each of these have some merit including the ill defined measures of difficulty and
effort.
Unfortunately, little guidance is provided in the literature for how one might collect or estimate
the most important of these measures. The reason for this is that it is difficult and there is no
accepted scientific or engineering process for determining them. For example, while known
vulnerability counts can be made for each component it is simply unknown how to convert that
information to a probability of component compromise. One recent effort to at least approach the
issue can be found in [26].
The issue of estimating unknown vulnerabilities also remains an outstanding research issue with
little research done to date. We are pursuing collaborative research in attack surfaces [16] and
time-to-compromise estimations in an attempt to stimulate research into statistical estimates for
relevant measures. We believe that significant opportunities exist for improving the state of the
art in this domain.
One other area where reasonable security measures are sorely lacking is in defensive devices. For
example, recent work by [4] indicates that simple obfuscations of well known viruses may easily
bypass anti-virus software. Worse, the specific obfuscations needed can be reverse engineered
from the virus signature files. Consequently, what measures should be used in assessing the
security provided by anti-virus tools is more of an open question than the associated vendors
would seem willing to indicate. This situation applies to intrusion detection and protection
devices and many of the other defensive mechanisms available for installation in a control system
environment. We are now investigating possible measures for a few of these devices.
For our prototype tool we developed a process for estimating the time it would take an attacker to
successfully attack an individual component of the system. This value is dependent upon the
threat level and defenses chosen by the user. This is just one of many metrics that might be
reasonably applied as an intermediate measure to aid the estimation of risk reduction. Whatever
metrics are chosen, they must be intuitively associated with risk and defensibly mapped to risk
reduction. Some of the measures and metrics must represent some estimate of unknown
vulnerabilities and the susceptibility of the component to attack because of the unknowns. As
mentioned earlier, some recent work in this area includes attack surface estimation. A significant
research effort is still required to determine useable security measures and metrics for software
components.
3.5 Consequence Value
Understanding the possible range of consequences from a successful cyber attack on an
infrastructure’s control system is necessary for risk estimation. In more traditional areas of risk
analysis (e.g. nuclear power), estimating consequences is a very difficult task that typically
requires a significant amount of analysis and site-specific data about the facility, as well as the co-
located facilities and populations. These detailed analyses can take man-years of effort, even with
complete data availability. Consequently, this approach is usually only applied to high-
consequence, high-cost operations.
The introduction of cyber attacks only complicates this already difficult analysis. The types of
additional complications that can arise include: the likelihood of events that may be missed in the
analysis due to the tremendous variability in the types of attacks; a dramatic difference in attack
consequence due to the level of detailed knowledge the attacker has about the control system; and
the difficulty of making accurate predictions from historical events since there have been so few
actual consequences from cyber attacks on control systems that have been reported.
Some of the existing validated consequence codes (e.g. air dispersion, toxicological, and
economic techniques) used in such applications as geographic information systems (GIS),
probabilistic risk analysis (PRA), and human reliability analysis, might be adapted or refined for
use in risk estimates from attacks on control systems used in critical infrastructure.
In the current Risk Reduction Estimation tool, all of the above complications have been removed
and the consequence value is simply determined by the user and indicates a dollar cost associated
with a successful attack on the system. In general one would suppose that as the control system
changes and defensive mechanisms are added and deleted then the possible consequences might
change as well. However, that issue requires further research and development activities.
3.6 Percent Risk Reduction Value
The percent risk reduction value is provided by the underlying quantitative risk calculation engine
and is determined based on the threat level and defenses chosen by the user. The percent risk
reduction scale bar is directly related to the percent risk reduction value provided by the
underlying quantitative risk calculation engine. As discussed previously, the underlying security
models and measures is one of the most important and difficult areas requiring significant
additional research efforts and insights.
4.0 Conclusion
The overarching goal is to make the creation of a quantitative risk reduction estimation tool
feasible and generalizable to any control system environment. We demonstrated the need for
significant additional research and development efforts across a number of disciplines, and
identified specific technological barriers that need to be overcome before a complete risk
reduction estimation tool can be produced. Increased research emphasis in assessing the unknown
risks in software components, establishing some baseline quantitative security measures and
metrics, and creating more practical risk reduction calculational engines is needed. Economic
consequence estimation models, particularly for ripple effects across the economy, also need
significant research. However, even with these formidable research and development challenges
we believe that the value of a quantitative risk reduction estimation tool is significant, may
shortly be able to provide improved estimations over current qualitative techniques, and should be
pursued.
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